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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUDEAN H. COX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
— vs. — 
EDWARD C. CARLISLE, Mayor of 
Manti City, MANTI CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation, Henry Henningson, John 
Mcintosh and Ed Nielson, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In reply to Defendants-Respondents Brief the present 
case is not concerned with the question "of whether a per-
son can acquire public property merely by claiming owner-
ship," but rather is there one rule of morals for a munici-
pality and another for an individual. Should the doctrine of 
Equitable Estoppel be subjected to fixed and narrow con-
fines of a technical formula or should each case be considered 
in the light of its own particular facts and circumstances ? 
Case No. 9242 
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Do the facts in this case call upon the Court to use the 
Doctrine of Estoppel to prevent injustice? 
Only by examination of the evidence can the Court 
answer these questions. 
The Defendants-Respondents would have the Court look 
at the naked legal title and ignore the facts of usage, the 
emotion that always comes with injustice and the great 
damage which will be caused by opening the strip of land 
between Parcel 99 and 113. The defendants ask this Court 
to rule against the Plaintiff, who with her predecessors have 
been using this strip of land as part of a farming operation 
for the past 70 years and as long as the memory of man. 
Plaintiff-Apellant also agrees generally with the De-
fendants' statement of facts in so far as it repeats the oc-
curances at the trial, however, Plaintiff does not agree with 
some conclusions drawn and therefore earnestly solicits the 
Court to examine the testimony and the evidence submitted. 
The Petition signed by over 40 farmers in this area in 1910, 
the commissioners' report, and the Court Order in Civil Case 
No. 786, in the District Court in and for Sanpete County, 
Utalh, Fred Jensen et al vs. Manti City, should be treated 
as evidence as to whether there was a road on these premises 
at any time. 
Plaintiff contends that in view of the statement of the 
signers of the Petition and the oral evidence submitted to 
the Court the evidence is overwhelming to the effect that 
there has never been a road or street on the strip of land 
separating parcels 99 and 113. 
The living witness most familiar with the land is Dr. 
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H. R. Clark who owned property immediately to the north 
and definitely stated he had been familiar with the land 
for over the past 70 years. He stated there had never been 
a road of any type on said strip of land. (See P. 77.) 
All the Defendants' witnesses stated there were bars 
in the fences and in every case on cross examination had 
the bars further to the north on the Clark premises. 
Defendants would have the court believe there will be 
no damage by building a road over the land. The husband 
of the Plaintiff testified on page 85 as follows concerning 
the improvements: 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) What have been the nature 
of the improvements? 
Answer: Well, the first place we changed our irriga-
tion system by running the water different ways. 
It used to go several ways over the land. We re-
leveled it so we could handle our water most ef-
ficiently by changing our ditches around. 
Question: Concerning water rights, have you had oc-
casion to drill wells and anything in the vicinity. 
Answer: Yes. We drilled a well there, a twelve-inch 
well. We didn't drill it. The well was there. But 
we equipped it with a pump and everything. 
Question: Have you had the occasion to improve the 
land further by constructing ponds ? 
Answer: Oh, we have. 
Question: Lining ditches? 
Answer: We have constructed a pond there. We have 
put in concrete pipes to take care of the water, our 
3 
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Question: Mr. Cox, do you have any idea on how much 
you have improved the land since 1948? 
Answer: Well, we have spent in the neighbodhood of 
$15,000 on this land. 
Question: And approximately how many acres would 
that cover? 
Answer: Eighty acres. 
Question: That would cover the land known as Parcel 
99 and Parcel 113, and the land between those 
parcels? 
Answer: That is right." 
As was set forth in Defendants' brief the boundary line 
in the Detachment proceedings is very interesting. The De-
fendants drew it in their brief to show that there was a 
definite jog made in the petition, commissioners' findings 
and Court decree to take in these particular Parcels 113 and 
99. 
Detachment Line N 
Detachment Line 
W 
No. 113 
Road 
No. 99 
E 
S 
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Why did the boundary make such a jog? The only 
answer is that there were no roads or city improvements 
in the detached area and there never had been. 
It-should also be kept in mind that this area we are 
talking" about has no homes or other buildings near it now 
or in the history of Manti City. 
To now allow construction of a road will separate into 
two pieces the Plaintiff's 80-acre farm which (page 95) 
would vitally effect and damage the irrigation system for 
the entire farm operation. The Plaintiff's husband Grant 
Cox on page 95 testified as follows: 
Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) As I understand, then, this 
farm is based upon an operating unit, based on your 
irrigation system, your ponds, your wells and your 
leveling, is that right? 
Answer: The whole thing was based on, when it was 
designed by the Soil Conservation, one piece fits 
in with the other piece to take care of the waste 
water from one piece to the headgate of another 
piece. It is all designed to use the water most 
efficiently. So if you take one piece away then 
you are spoiling the whole irrigation system. 
Question: So that, as I understand, if a tract of land 
was cut right through the middle, where the De-
fendants claim their roadway is, it would vitally 
affect the irrigation system for the balance of the 
farm. Is that correct? 
5 
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Answer: That is correct." 
Further on page 95 Mr. Cox testifies: 
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Would you tell the Court 
whether or not the cutting of a, the taking of a 
parcel of property between Parcel 99 and Parcel 
113, if there is such a piece of property, would 
effect the irrigation system on the balance of your 
farm? 
Answer: Yes. It would make quite a difference if they 
went, if they went north on that piece I would have 
to relevel that piece of land below in order to take 
my water out of the ditch again, because the top 
piece of land the water runs west and we've got it 
leveled so that the bottom piece of land there is a 
headgate or a headditch and it runs east there so 
that we can take care of the top water, tail water, 
from there and run it east to irrigate the bottom 
part, so that we would have to relevel the whole 
piece if they started cutting through it. 
Question: What would happen as to the parcel above, 
or when I mean above, I mean south of such an 
alleged— 
Answer: Well, if it done that why I would just, I would 
want to sell the land, because it would just make it 
valueless to me as a unit. I couldn't, it would make 
it too long of a strip to irrigate decent. It just 
wouldn't be an efficient setup then." 
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Defendants would have the Court believe the improve-
testified as follows: 
ments were all made after the city indicated it wanted to 
build a road on the strip of land. In answer to Defendants' 
question on page 96, Mr. Cox the husband of the Plaintiff 
"Question: (By Mr. Roe) When did you put in this 
irrigation system, Mr. Cox? That is, I will'make, 
was this before or after the City told you that they 
claimed a right in that road ? 
Answer: You mean pertaining to what we have done 
to the irrigation system ? 
Question: Yes. You were telling us about how this road 
would effect the system, and I want to know how 
much of that comes from things you did after you 
received notice of the City's claim. 
Answer: Well, the well was drilled before the city ever 
said anything. The land was leveled one time be-
fore the City said anything about it, and in 1955 
I releveled it again because there were a few, a 
little waves in there so that it wouldn't work too 
efficient. So we leveled it again. We had, all of the, 
our headgates was poured before that, before the 
City told me about they wanted a road through 
there. "Since then I have built a pond and we have 
put in pipe, cement pipe and cement ditches." : 
7 
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SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
FOR A REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTAN-
CES INVOLVED THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO USE THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL TO PRE-
VENT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MANTI CITY 
FROM OPENING THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND 
USED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S FARM 
AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 8, WHERE IT FOUND THAT 
THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND BETWEEN PAR-
CELS 99 AND 113, PLAT "A" MANTI CITY SURVEY, 
HAD BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 9, WHERE IT FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF OR HER PREDECESSORS IN IN-
TEREST WERE NOT IN OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID 66 
FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND AT THE TIME OF THE 
ENTRY UPON THE LAND BY THE CORPORATE AUTH-
ORITIES OF MANTI CITY. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 10, WHEN IT HELD THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP WAS OCCUPIED 
BY ANY PRIVATE PERSON AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO 
THE DATE OF THE PATENT TO LUTHER T. TUTTLE, 
MAYOR OF MANTI, AND THAT IF THE 66 FOOT WIDE 
STRIP WAS NOT BEING USED AS A PUBLIC STREET 
AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY, IT WAS VACANT AND 
UNOCCUPIED, AND ON JANUARY 25, 1892, WAS 
DEDICATED AS A PUBLIC STREET. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT NUMBER 12, WHEN IT FOUND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT OR 
ANY ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC STREET BY 
MANTI CITY OR BY OFFICIAL CITY OR COUNTY AC-
TION. 
REPLY ARGUMENT ON ALL POINTS 
The Defendants-Respondents case is basically a reliance 
on the fact that the record title of the strip of land between 
Parcels 99 and 113 is in the name of Manti City. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant acknowledged the title but ar-
gues there are circumstances where a Court must look be-
yond the letter of the law and decide what is equitable as to 
the parties based upon the circumstances involved. 
9 
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Plaintiff contends there has never been an actual road 
over this strip of land, that it is a paper road only. The 
witnesses relied on by the Defendants never had their al-
leged travels on the strip of land herein involved but upon 
the land of H.R. Clark north of Parcel No. 113. Dr. H. R. 
Clark? a life long resident of Manti, has been familiar with 
this property for over 70 years and states that there has 
never been a road of any type- on the strip of land between 
Parcel 99 and 113. 
Plaintiff introduced as evidence to show there had 
never been a road over the premises the Detachment pro-
ceedings, Civil Case No. 786, in the District Court in and 
for Sanpete County, Utah, which included a Petition signed 
by over %ths of the farmers owning land immediately north 
of Manti City (in excess of 40 farmers) including the 
Plaintiff's predecessors in interest. This Petition is signed 
by the land owners in 1910, and in essence said there was 
no road or street on the strip of land in question and there 
had never been. 
The Court appointed three Commissioners to adjust the 
terms of the property to be severed. These Commissioners 
also reported no property belonging to the City, no streets 
or road on the detached area which includes the premises 
in question. 
The Court on May 20, 1910, Judge A. J. Christensen 
issued an order in pursuance to the Commissioner's Report 
and prayer. 
Compare this Petition, Commissioners' report and 
Court Order made in 1910, together with Dr. H. R. Clark's 
10 
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testimony that there had never been a road to the evidence 
there was a road submitted by Defendants' witnesses. 
This Court as in Wall vs. Salt Lake City, (50 Utah 573, 
168 Pacific 766), held there were an exceptional class of 
cases when it was the duty of the Court to decide as "right 
and justice require" and the Court then estopped Salt Lake 
City from clearing the premises therein as a Public Street. 
In Wall vs. Salt Lake City there was affirmative mis-
leading conduct. Defendant would have the Court believe 
that because Manti City never did anything for over 70 
years the Doctrine of Estoppel couldn't apply. 
In 19 American Jurisprudence, Section 33, it states: 
"Since, however, the principle which underlies 
equitable estoppel in its proper sense runs through-
out all the transactions and contracts of civilized 
life, such estoppel cannot be subjected to fixed and 
settled rules of universal application, like legal 
estoppels, or hampered by the narrow confines of a 
technical formula. In other words, each case of es-
toppel must in the nature of things stand on its 
own bottom." 
Our Court has on several occasions held that inaction 
or silence may under some circumstances amount to a mis-
representation and concealment of the true facts so as to 
raise an equitable estoppel. In Hilton vs. Sloan, et al, (108 
Pac. 44, 37 Ut 359) the Court held: 
"The Doctrine of "estoppel in pais" is an equi-
table doctrine originally applied to prevent an ad-
vantage to be taken of strict legal rights, and the 
11 
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equities of the particular facts must control in ap-
plying it." 
Our Court in Utah State Building Comn. vs. Great 
American I. Co. (140 P. 2d 763,105 Utah 11), while holding 
the facts in that case were not sufficient to justify an 
estoppel still stated that: 
"It is true as stated by our Court in the case of 
Hilton vs. Sloan et al., 37 Utah 357, at Page 373,108 
P. 689, at page 694, "It is almost unnecessary to add 
that mere inaction or silence may, under peculiar 
circumstances, amount to both misrepresentation 
and concealment, which may amount to an estoppel. 
This doctrine is referred to and approved in the 
later case of Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company 
et al. 76 Utah 335, 289 P. 151. 
Our Court in Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company (76 
Utah 335, 289 P. 151) committed itself to the Doctrine of 
Estoppel as follows: 
"Doctrine of estoppel applies where person un-
dertakes to deny as true what he has by conduct 
over a long period avowed as true." 
"Intent to deceive need not always be shown in 
order to estop person." 
An annotation concerning "Estoppel of Municipality to 
Open or Use Street" appears in 171 ALR 94. On page 98 
Under II (a) General Consideration it sets forth the general 
rule: 
12 
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As stated in American Jurisprudence: "It is 
generally recognized that with respect to matters 
within the scope of its power and authority to act, a 
municipal corporation is subject to the rules of es-
toppel in those cases wherein equity and justice re-
quire their application, and where such application 
will not interfere with the proper exercise of gov-
ernmental functions; 
some authorities apply the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel to municipal corporations even where they 
are acting in a governmental capacity, where jus-
tice, right, and the equities of the situation demand 
it. In any event, the doctrine of estoppel is applied 
in the case of municipal corporations with caution 
and only under circumstances clearly demanding its 
application to prevent manifest injustice/' 
It further states on page 110 as follows: 
"Doctrine of estoppel. 
According to one substantial line of authority, 
an estoppel to open or use a street may arise where 
there is long-continued nonuser thereof by the 
municipality, together with possession of the street 
areas by private parties acting in good faith and in 
the belief that its use or once intended use as a 
street has been abandoned, and their erection of 
valuable improvements thereon without objection 
from the municipality, which has knowledge there-
of, and the situation is such that to permit the 
municipality to reclaim the land would result in 
great damage to those in possession." 
13 
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Plaintiff contends there are extraordinary factors pres-
ent in thds case which should give rise to the Doctrine of 
Estoppel. 
(First) There is no evidence of a road having 
ever been established on the ground, there are no 
fences separating the strip from other land, no 
grading, and no travel on the premises for over 70 
years and as long as the memory of man. 
(Second) Plaintiff has put improvements on 
the premises and has established an engineered ir-
rigation system to get the maximum beneficial use 
of an 80-acre farm. This system required the level-
ing of land in order for the waste water to be reused 
from one area to another. It also included the 
cementing of ditches and headgates, and the piping 
of water, all to an expense in excess of $15,000.00 
for only 80 acres of land. 
(Third) That the alleged city road is outside 
the city's limit and no purpose for the construction 
has been shown. 
(Fourth) To allow the city to now construct a 
farm road over the premises would greatly damage 
the Plaintiff's farm operation by destroying the ir-
rigation system for the entire 80 acres. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
This is a proper case for the Court to apply the Doc-
trine of Estoppel and establish that there is not one rule 
of morals for a municipality and another for an individual. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this 
case and cause be remanded to the Court below with in-
structions that the Court prevent the City from entering 
the premises and the Court fix the damages caused to the 
Plaintiff based upon the evidence submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON V. TIBBS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Manti, Utah 
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